Abstract-XACML and its reference implementation can not directly support quantified risk adaptive access control, because there are several special requirements to specify and enforce the policies in risk adaptive access control: the elements in these policies, such as risk, risk level, are not covered; and risk in quantified risk adaptive access control would be mutable, accumulated and required to be continuously controlled. This paper, therefore, extends XACML and its reference implementation to support quantified risk adaptive access control. This paper makes two contributions: design a risk adaptive policy language extended from XACML; and propose a framework to enforce the policies. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first research work to discuss this topic.
I. INTRODUCTION Quantified risk adaptive access control [1][2][3][4]
[5] is a hot spot in the field of information security, because the mechanism may ensure information sharing with maximal information availability in a cooperative environment. Risk generally exists in all sensitive accesses [6] . On one hand, traditional access control mechanisms, such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [7] , which implicitly consider risk, specify their security policies. On the other hand, quantified risk adaptive access control explicitly measures the risk of a sensitive access request, then allows the access if the risk is under an acceptable risk level. The main advantage of risk adaptive access control is that when an emergent event in some important scenarios, for example a battle field or the financial market, happens, the mechanism may offer faster and more promising responses.
The JASON report [1] proposed three guiding principles to implement the quantified risk adaptive access control, however it did not mention ways to specify and enforce these policies of quantified risk adaptive access control. The JASON report pointed out three steps to implement quantified risk adaptive access control: i. Measuring risk; ii. The establishment of an acceptable risk level; iii. Ensuring that the information is distributed all the way up to the acceptable risk level. But how to set policies which are aware of acceptable risk levels and how to enforce these policies are two important problems, which are missed in JASON report.
According to our investigation, XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) [8] and its reference implementation [9] can not directly support quantified risk adaptive access control, because some elements are not included in its policy model, and the policies in the policy model must enforce with continuous assurance for risk control.
This paper first analyzes and resolves these two problems, namely extending XACML to specify the policies in risk adaptive access control, and proposing a framework to enforce the policies. Past researches rarely considered the risk of denying access. However the proposed language and framework in this paper consider this issue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes and analyzes the problems of how to specify and enforce the policies of quantified risk adaptive access control; Section III introduces the related work; Section IV extends XACML to specify the policies of quantified risk adaptive access control; Section V proposes an enforcement framework; Section VI discusses the possible issues in our work; and Section VII summarizes the paper and introduces our future work.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

A. Issues to Specify and Enforce the Policies
Different from the policies in traditional access control, such as DAC and RBAC, the policies of quantified risk adaptive access control have the following issues to consider.
• Mutability: In quantified risk adaptive access control, risk has an important feature: Mutability, when the risk is measured and used. This feature means risk usually changes when the access context data change.
• Accumulation: Risk can be accumulated when time passes. There are two cases where risk will be accumulated: one appears when identical or similar accesses happen, the other appears when the access takes long term time. Basically, the risk depends not only on the probability of damage, but also on the temporal distribution of the damage actions. Some previous researches assumed the distribution is lognormal [3] . Therefore, we can get the accumulated risk at time t according to the distribution. 
B. Basic Ways to Resolve the Issues
According to our investigation, the current XACML specification and its reference implementation can not resolve the above three issues. This paper extend XACML and its reference implementation to present the issues. The basic ways are as follows:
• Specify policies by extending XACML. We will design RXACML (Risk adaptive eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) extended from XACML to specify the following elements: risk, risk level, risk mitigation, risk adaptive policies.
• Enhance session control in PEP. Session control means that a module in PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) will control and enforce the policies in the whole session. Traditional access control enforcement usually enforces the security policies at the beginning of the session. That is, when a request is passed by PDP (Policy Decision Point), the request will accomplish whatever the system changes. However due to the mutability mentioned in Section II-A, a system would abort a session due to risk change. Therefore, we will extend the reference implementation of XACML with session control to enforce the policies of quantified risk adaptive access control.
• Enforce risk accumulation control in PEP. Risk accumulation control means a module in PEP will control the enforcement of the policies according to accumulated risk. Note that risk accumulation happens not only in a session, but across multiple sessions. Thus, session control can not cover this function.
• Leverage the obligation in XACML 3.0 [8] to manage risk mitigation. Risk mitigation can boost information sharing when a high risk access happens. But how to manage risk mitigation is a problem for quantified risk adaptive access control. This paper, therefore, uses the new feature in XACML 3.0 (obligation) to enforce this feature in quantified risk adaptive access control.
III. RELATED WORK MITRE [1] published the JASON report, which leveraged risk to flexibly ensure information sharing among agencies and units in U. S. and its allied. To the extension of the JASON report, Cheng [2] proposed a method to enforce quantified risk adaptive access control in a multi-level security system. In their method, a sensitive access could be authorized according to the measured risk. Although the access is not allowed by the policies in the multi-level security system. Molloy et al. [3] used a risk market to improve the security of access control. In their method, a risk market can trade risk tokens, and control the access to sensitive information. Based on their assumption of the perfect competition, the risk market will balance the availability and the confidentiality of the sensitive information, thus providing a more flexible control on the information. Han et al. [6] applied measurable risk to strengthen the security of a delegation supporting workflow system. Dimmork et al. [10] leveraged trust and risk to control sensitive accesses. Liu et al. [4] leveraged incentives to mitigate inadvertent inside threats. These researchers had discussed the problems where quantified risk adaptive access control can be applied, how the risk market works, and how incentives work in an enterprise information system. However they did not resolve how to specify and enforce the policies in quantified risk adaptive access control. Ni et al. [11] leveraged fuzzy theories to develop a enforcement for risk based access control.
There are previous works on enforcing complex policies in an information system. Zhang et al. [12] proposed a usage-based authorization framework where they discussed and resolved the two issue of decision continuity and attribute mutability. Xu et al. [13] discussed session-aware RBAC administration and enforcement with XACML. Tripunitara et al. [14] discussed efficient access enforcement in distributed RBAC deployments.
IV. EXTEND XACML TO SPECIFY THE POLICIES OF QUANTIFIED RISK ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL
A. Express Risk and Risk Level
Based on the above analysis in Section II, we formally define the risk as follows:
In Definition 1, risk is a measurement at time t, and depends on the value of the object, the damage probability and the risk distribution. Here, t is increased from the time of the initial access to the expected time point. Note that the risk at the time t is actually a number.
Risk levels rather than risk is used as control criterion in quantified risk adaptive access control [1] [2] [6] . Therefore, we define risk level as follows:
Here, Risk refers to a set of risk defined in Definition 1, and Range is an area, such as [100, 800).
Based on Definition 1 and 2, we express risk and risk level as follows:
<xs:element name="Risk" type="rxacml:RiskType"/> <xs:complexType name="RiskType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="rxacml:MeasureAlgorithm"/> <xs:element ref="rxacml:ValueofObject"/> <xs:element ref="rxacml:Probability"/> <xs:element ref="rxacml:Distribution"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="Risk_Level" type="rxacml:Risk_LevelType"/> <xs:complexType name="Risk_LevelType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="grade" type="GradeType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:complexType name="GradeType"> <xs:attribute name="level" type="xs:integer" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="range.begin" type="xs:integer" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="range.end" type="xs:integer" use="required"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:complexType> RXACML considers two types of risk: risk of allowing access (RAA) and risk of denying access (RDA). We respectively express the two types of risk as risk RAA and risk RDA .
B. Express the Risk Mitigation Policies
Han et al. [6] proposed a formal definition of risk mitigation policies as follows:
In Definition 3, MitigationAction refers to the actions that mitigate the risk. These actions will work on certain Risk Level, and make certain MitigationEffects. Cheng et al. [2] proposed three categories of risk mitigation: deterrence, prevention, and limiting damage.
Based on Definition 3, we express risk mitigation policies as follows:
<xs:element name="Risk_Mitigation" type="Risk_MitigationType"/> <xs:complexType name="Risk_MitigationType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="rxacml:MitigationAction"/> <xs:element ref="rxacml:Risk_Level"/> <xs:element ref="rxacml:MitigationEffect"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
C. Express the Policies of Quantified Risk Adaptive Access Control Definition 4: (RACPolicy)
In Definition 4, each policy refers that an action a ∈ A performed by a subject s ∈ S on an object o ∈ O under a risk level could be allowed or denied according to Effect. Here, Effect could be Permit or Deny.
Based on Definition 4, we express the quantified risk adaptive access control policies as follows:
<xs:element name="Policy" type="rxacml:PolicyType"/> <xs:complexType name="PolicyType"> <xs:sequence> ... <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> ... <xs:element ref="rxacml:Rule"/> ... </xs:choice> <!--All other elements in the policy defined in XACML 3.0--> ... <xs:element ref="rxacml:Risk_Level" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <!--Define all defined risk levels here.--> <xs:element ref="rxacml:Risk_Mitigation" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <!--Define all risk mitigation actions.--> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:element name="Rule" type="rxacml:RuleType"> <xs:complexTypename="RuleType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="rxacml:Target" minOccurs="0"/> <!--This element assigns (S, O, A)--> <xs:element ref="rxacml:MeasureAlgorithm"/> <!--this element assign the algorithm to measure risk. Whether the risk is of RAA or RDA depends on the effect attribute in the rule.--> <xs:element ref="rxacml:Condition" <!--This element assigns accepted risk level.--> minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="RuleId" type="xs:string" use="required"/> <xs:attribute name="Effect" type="xacml:EffectType" use="required"/> </xs:complexType>
D. Define Response
Response is defined as follows:
Risk Mitigation
Here, ResponseEffect would be allowed or denied; Risk is defined in Definition 1; Risk Level is defined in Definition 2; and 2
Risk Mitigation refers to all possible subsets of Risk Mitigation defined in Definition 3. This type of response is similar to the response with obligations defined in XACML.
This definition means that an access is allowed or denied when the risk mitigation actions work. At the same time, the PDP also provides the measured risk from the RMP and Risk Level for the enhanced PEP. The enhanced PEP will continuously control the risk under the acceptable risk assigned by the element of Risk Level.
Note that, if several policies in the policy set can be applicable to the access, we must merge acceptable risk levels. Two strategies are proposed if the Effects in these policies are the same: Maximum strategy, which chooses the maximum risk level in all applicable policies; and Minimum strategy, which chooses the minimum risk level in all applicable policies. If the Effects in these policies are different, additional combining algorithms should be required. We will briefly discuss this problem in Section VI and leave this problem to future work.
Based on Definition 5, we express the response as follows:
<xs:element name="Response" type="rxacml:ResponseType"/> <xs:complexType name="ResponseType" > <xs:sequence> <xs: element ref="rxacml:ResponseEffect"/> <xs: element ref="rxacml:Risk"/> <xs: element ref="rxacml:Risk_Level"/> <xs: element ref="rxacml:Risk_Mitigation" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
V. ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK
The enforcement framework enforces the quantified risk adaptive access control policies. When a risky access request is launched by a subject, the module in the enforcement framework will process, evaluate, and determine the request. If the access request is approved by the PDP, a module named enhanced PEP, will continuously control the risk of the access under an acceptable risk level, to resolve the issues of continuity, mutability and accumulation described in Section II-A. In addition, if the access request is denied by the PDP, the module will continuously control the risk of denying access under an acceptable level as well.
A. Data Flow in the Framework
As is shown in Figure 1 , we propose two new modules or sub-modules, RMP (Risk Measure Point) and risk mitigation service, and one enhanced module, enhanced PEP (Policy Enforce Point), in the data flow model which is extended from the data flow model of XACML 3.0:
• RMP (Risk Measure Point): measures the risk when PDP makes access control decision. Note that, RMP will enquire attributes through the context handler. These context attributes are the parameters to measure the quantified risk.
• risk mitigation service: the risk mitigation service is a sub-module of the obligation service proposed in XACML 3.0. Different from the general obligation service in XACML 3.0, the risk mitigation service must return the effects of risk mitigation actions. That is, enhanced PEP will continuously enforce the request.
• enhanced PEP: In XACML 3.0, PEP (Policy Enforce Point) is defined as "the system entity that performs access control, by making decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions." Different from the PEP in XACML 3.0, two new features are defined as follows: the enhanced PEP additionally determines the risky access request according to the effects of the risk mitigation actions, and continuously controls the quantified risk under an acceptable risk level;. We will further describe the enhanced PEP in Section V-C.
B. Risk Mitigation Aware Decision
The PDP in the framework will evaluate the risky access request, and respond to the enhanced PEP. Different from the traditional evaluation in XACML, the evaluation in RXACML will consider the risk, risk level and risk mitigation. Moreover, if multiple rules or policies are applicable to the risk access request, then how can we combine the results from the rules and policies? We introduce the evaluation algorithm as follows: The time complexity of the above algorithm depends on the number of rules. The time complexity is in O(n) where n is the number of rules in a policy set. The performance problem could occur when many policies with multiple rules are required to be evaluated. Fortunately, according to our investigation, the policies in quantified risk adaptive access control could be simple, and the complexity of quantified risk adaptive access control usually depends on the risk measure.
ALGORITHM
C. Enhanced PEP
The enhanced PEP (EPEP for short) is extended from PEP in the reference implement of XACML. The main enhancement of the EPEP is that session control is enabled according to the mutable and accumulated risk, after the EPEP receives a response defined in Definition 5.
The concrete enhanced functions include:
• evaluate the effects of risk mitigation actions: Different from the dataflow of traditional obligation in XACML, each risk mitigation action included in a response should be executed or existing when a risky access is running. When the effects return from the risk mitigation service arrive at the EPEP, the EPEP will determine whether the access should continue according to the returned effects.
• connect the PDP if the risk is changed: this function is triggered by two cases: one is a timer. That is, after a preset time span, the EPEP will re-request the PDP to evaluate a new response; the other is a context-changing event. That is, once a context-changing event which requires to re-evaluate the risk probability, the EPEP will re-request the PDP to evaluate a new response.
• control session: the EPEP will control the access session according to accumulated or changed risk. The response has included the risk which includes the temporal distribution. The EPEP can get the accumulated risk if we do not consider the changing access context. Of course, if we consider the changing access context, we must launch the second function described in the above to re-evaluate the risky access request. The second part of this function is to ensure the integrality if the access is aborted. In other words, once the EPEP aborts a running access, the system status should keep consistent. This is an open problem, and other researches [12] will face it.
VI. DISCUSSION
The first problem is to combine the evaluation result of rules and policies. Currently, many researches involved proposing a well-formed combination logic or algorithm for traditional XACML [15] . Obviously, the combination problem in RX-ACML will be more complex than the one in XACML, especially, when continuous variable (risk) must be dealt with. In this paper, we only deal with a simple scenario where the effects of applicable rules or policies are the same, and leave out the complex scenario where the effects of applicable rules or policies are different. We propose to leverage the theories of fuzzy set and fuzzy logic [16] to deal with the fuzzy and continuity issues of the risk.
The second problem is how to control the risk if the access is denied. This paper considers the case where the PDP and the EPEP will evaluate the quantified risk adaptive access and deny the access under an acceptable risk. However we do not consider the case where the risk changes after the risky access control is denied. This case is more complex than that where the risky access is allowed, because any denied access will cause the risk to exceed the acceptable risk. The possible solution is to exploit system risk mitigation actions and manage them to reduce the risk to the acceptable risk level.
The third problem is performance. We do not clarify the performance evaluation, because the performance is not a hot issue in the access control field. And there are some possible solutions to accelerate the policy decision, such as to build index according to < Target > in the rule.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The paper describes what we believe is the first paper to discuss and resolve how to specify and enforce risk adaptive access control through extending XACML. We describe all the necessary elements in quantified risk adaptive access control in the formal language and XML; and introduce how to enforce these policies, which include the data flow, the decision algorithm, and the functions of the enhanced PEP.
In our future work, we will design a novel combination algebra based on the theories of fuzzy set and fuzzy logic, and implement the framework proposed in this paper.
